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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Faron Stone appeals from his convictions and sentences for aggravated 
battery on a law enforcement officer and unlawful possession of a firearm. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
Officers went to serve a no-knock search warrant at the residence 
occupied by Stone and Maria Villa. (P.H. Tr., p. 7, L. 4 - p. 8, L. 10.') The basis 
for judicial departure from the normal knock and announce requirement was 
Stone's history of violence and evidence that he was armed with a ,357 Magnum 
handgun and a . I2  gauge shotgun. (P.H. Tr., p. 8, Ls. 11-24; p. 32, Ls. 1-24.) 
The police planned to execute the warrant by having five officers go through the 
front door using a noise flash distraction device and two officers go through the 
back door and hold their positions, while another officer announced their 
presence and that they were executing a search warrant. (P.H. Tr., p. 9, L. 1 - p. 
14, L. 10.) 
At about 1:30 in the morning the officers executed their plan. (P.H. Tr., p. 
14, L. 9 -p. 16, L. 13; p. 60, L. 16- p. 61, L. 23; p. 79, L. 10 - p. 80, L. 12.) The 
officers were wearing protective vests labeled "police," helmets and other 
protective gear, and long sleeve shirts also marked "police." (P.H. Tr., p. 16, L. 
15 - p. 17, L. 16; p. 61, L. 24 - p. 62, L. 4.) On the signal from the leading 
' A copy of the preliminary hearing transcript is included in the record as an 
exhibit. Because the line numbers do not exactly correspond with lines of text, 
line numbers are approximate and based on the nearest number on the page. 
1 
officer, the police breached the front and back doors, used the noise flash 
distraction device at the front, announced their presence and entered the 
residence. (P.H. Tr., p. 17, L. 20-p.  19, L. 10; p. 20, L. 21 -p.24, L. 3; p. 62, L. 
5 - p. 64, L. 14; p. 80, L. 13 - p. 81, L. 9.) As soon as the officers entered they 
were fired upon, and returned fire. (P.H. Tr., p. 19, L. 10-12; p. 24, L. 4 - p. 25, 
L. 25; p. 64, L. 3 - p. 65, L. 20; p. 81, L. 10 - p. 82, L. 19.) The officers 
immediately retreated and called in additional officers to try and contain the 
scene. (P.H. Tr., p. 19, L. 13-  p. 20, L. 20; p. 27, L. 10-p.  28, L. 3; p. 83, L. 16 
- p. 85, L. 9.) One of those additional officers arrived in his police vehicle with 
his lights on, and was shot at once from the house. (P.H. Tr., p. 28, Ls. 4-22.) 
Two officers were wounded. (P.H. Tr., p. 24, Ls. 13-21 ; p. 65, L. 5 - p. 67, 
L. 18; p. 82, L. 3 - p. 83, L. 14.) Both of the officers were wounded by a ,357 
caliber round, a caliber that none of the officers were armed with that night. (P.H. 
Tr., p. 105, L. 3 - p. 119, L. 16.) In an interview after he was later apprehended, 
Stone admitted having been present at the scene and firing the ,357 Magnum. 
(P.H.Tr.,p. 125,L.3-p. 134,L.20.) 
The state charged Stone with two counts of aggravated battery on a law 
enforcement officer, one count of possession of methamphetamine, and one 
count of unlawful possession of a firearm, with enhancements for use of a firearm 
and being a persistent violator. (R., vol. 11, pp. 338-43.) The parties thereafter 
entered into a plea agreement whereby Stone pled guilty to one count of 
aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer and one count of unlawful 
possession of a firearm. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 476-89.) The court accepted the guilty 
plea, and ordered the PSI prepared by July 7, 2006, and scheduled the 
sentencing for July 13, 2006. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 484-86.) 
The PSI was prepared on July 7, 2006. (PSI, p. I .)  On July 13, 2006, for 
reasons that do not appear in the record, the district court continued the 
sentencing to August 17, 2006. (R., vol. I, ROA.) On August 2, 2006, Stone 
moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 490-91.) The specific 
grounds for the motion were that Stone claimed he did not understand that the 
prosecutor's recommendations were not binding on the court, and that he had 
been given only 48 hours to consider whether to take the plea agreement and felt 
pressured to take the plea. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 492-93.) 
New counsel, appointed to represent Stone after the initial motion to 
withdraw his plea, filed a second motion to withdraw the guilty plea alleging 
several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 513-21.) The 
district court denied the motion to withdraw the plea and sentenced Stone to 
consecutive terms of twenty five years with twenty years fixed for aggravated 
battery on a law enforcement officer and five years fixed for unlawful possession 
of a firearm. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 522-26.) Stone appealed after having his appeal 
rights restored through post conviction proceedings. (R., vol. I, pp. 110-16.) 
ISSUES 
Stone states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in applying the 
incorrect legal standard to the motion to withdraw the guilty 
pleas? 
B. Did the District Court err in finding that Mr. Stone's guilty pleas 
were knowing and voluntary given that they were entered 
without knowledge of the defenses being waived? 
C. Did the District Court err in denying the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea given that Mr. Stone had demonstrated just cause to 
grant the motion, his motivation for the motion was not simply to 
avoid a negative presentence report but rather to withdraw 
pleas entered in ignorance of several viable defenses, and 
there was no allegation that the State would be prejudiced by 
withdrawal? 
D. Did the District Court err in imposing an excessive sentence? 
(Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Stone failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the factual claims 
Stone made in support of his motion were either completely unsupported 
by evidence or were affirmatively belied by the record? 
2. Has Stone failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Stone Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denyin0 His Motion To Withdraw His Guiltv Plea 
A. Introduction 
Stone moved to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 490-91.) He 
supported his motion with an affidavit claiming he did not understand that the 
prosecutor's recommendations were not binding on the court, and that he had 
only 48 hours to consider whether to take the plea agreement and felt pressured 
to take the plea. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 492-93.) He, through new counsel, also filed a 
second motion to withdraw the plea asserting several claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 513-21.) Stone never supported this 
motion with any evidence whatsoever. (See ~enerally, R.; 10/19/06 Tr.) 
At the hearing the district court concluded that ail of Stone's factual 
allegations were disproved by the record, and on that basis denied the motion. 
(10/19/06 Tr., p. 22, L. 3 - p. 34, L. 23.) 
Stone argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-23.) Specifically, 
Stone contends the district court applied an incorrect legal standard (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 15-17); found incorrect facts (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-20); and failed to 
consider his claimed proper motivation in making the motion (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 20-23). Because Stone failed to establish in the district court a single factual 
premise for his motion, his argument has no merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellant seeking reversal of the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea must demonstrate an abuse of discretion. State v. Martinez, 89 ldaho 129, 
138, 403 P.2d 597, 603 (1965). Where the district court conducts a hearing and 
enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the 
findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Mitchell v. State, 132 ldaho 
274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998); Gabourie v. State, 125 ldaho 254, 
869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). Appellate review of the denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea is limited to whether the district court exercised sound 
judicial discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action. State v. Ward, 135 
ldaho 68, 71, 14 P.3d 388, 391 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. McFarland, 130 ldaho 
358, 361, 941 P.2d 330, 333 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the decision to grant or 
deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court). 
C. Stone Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denvina The Motion To Withdraw The Guiltv Plea Where Stone Failed To 
Prove A Sinale Factual Predicate For His Motion 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which 
provides: 
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or 
imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest 
injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of 
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea. 
The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right. State v. 
Carrasco, 117 ldaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990). The defendant bears 
the burden of proving, in the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn. 
Griffith v. State, 121 ldaho 371, 374-75, 825 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must 
determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 
11 1 (1991); State v. Rodrisuez, 118 ldaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. 
App. 1990). If the plea was voluntary, in the constitutional sense, then the court 
must determine whether other reasons exist to allow the defendant to withdraw 
the plea. When a motion is made prior to sentencing, the defendant must 
present a just reason for withdrawing the plea. State v. McFarland, 130 ldaho 
358, 361, 941 P.2d 330, 333 (Ct. App. 1997). The decision to grant or deny a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court. Id. 
However, where, as here, the defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea before 
the imposition of sentence "but after [he] has read his presentence report or 
received other information about his probable sentence, the court is to exercise 
broad discretion, but may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's 
apparent motive." State v. Johnson, 120 ldaho 408, 41 1, 816 P.2d 364, 366 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (citation omitted). The failure of a defendant to present and support a 
plausible reason for withdrawal, even in the absence of prejudice to the state, will 
dictate against granting the motion. State v. Ward, 135 ldaho 68, 72, 14 P.3d 
388, 392 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Dopp, 124 ldaho 481, 485, 861 P.2d 51, 
55 (1993); McFarland, 130 ldaho at 362, 941 P.2d at 334). 
Stone failed to prove a single factual predicate of his motion. He 
presented no evidence supporting his claims that prior counsel was ineffective in 
relation to his guilty plea. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 513-21.) The only evidence he 
presented was an unsworn "affidavit." That affidavit asserts the following: 
[At sentencing,] I was under the impression the Judge could 
not go higher that [the] 7112 plus 7112 year sentence that the 
prosecutor and the attorney agreed to. It was after I plead guilty 
that I understood [the] judge was not bound by it. Even though my 
attorneys told me that the hearing made it seem like I understood 
that the Judge wasn't bound. I thought the guilty plea could be 
withdrawn if he wanted to go higher than the 7112 plus 7112. 1 did 
not understand [that] the legal implications of the hearing were 
specifically designed to not allow me to take back my plea. 
Besides, I only had 48 hours to make this decision which 
was not enough time to make. I felt very pressured to take the 
plea. My attorneys told me that the 7112 plus 7112 was the longest I 
[would] have to do. This information was false. I feel that they 
weren't totally forthcoming with all the information I needed to make 
an informed decision. 
(R., vol. Ill, p. 492 (brackets and grammar original).) 
The claim that he thought the state's recommendation was binding on the 
court is directly belied by the record. In the plea questionnaire Stone specifically 
acknowledged that the maximum sentences he faced were, respectively, 25 
years and five years. (R., vol. Ill, p. 479.) He acknowledged understanding that 
the only person who could promise what sentence he could actually receive was 
the judge, and that "the judge is not required to follow the sentence 
recommendation by either [Stone's] attorney or the prosecutor." (R., vol. Ill, p. 
481.) The plea agreement he signed and filed was entitled "NON BINDING 
PLEA AGREEMENT." (R., vol. Ill, p. 487 (capitalization original).) It also 
specifically stated, right above Stone's signature, that the parties "AGREED and 
understood that the Plea Agreement is NOT binding on the Court." (R., vol. Ill, p. 
489 (emphasis original).) Before accepting the plea the court made sure Stone 
knew he was facing sentences of up to 25 and 5 years, and could go to prison for 
30 years. (5123106 Tr., p. 2, Ls. 2-23.) The judge specifically informed Stone that 
he had previously informed the parties that he would not accept a binding plea 
agreement, and Stone stated he understood. (5123106 Tr., p. 3, L. 5 - p. 7, L. 
12.) 
Likewise, Stone's claim that he did not have enough time and was 
pressured into pleading is also belied by the record. In the plea questionnaire 
Stone stated he had fully discussed the case with his counsel and was satisfied 
with his representation. (R., vol. Ill, p. 479.) He acknowledged that there were 
no threats or anything else to make him enter a plea against his will. (R., vol. Ill, 
p. 480.) He admitted the truth of the charges and waived his rights. (R., vol. Ill, 
pp. 480, 482.) He specifically stated it was his desire to enter a guilty plea. (R., 
vol. Ill, p. 483.) At the plea colloquy Stone stated that the only problem he had 
with his attorney was the attorney's propensity to tell "bad jokes." (5123106 Tr., p. 
8, L. 8 - p. 9, L. 5.) He stated he had enough time to talk with his counsel and 
that there was nothing further he wished to discuss with them. (5123106 Tr., p. 9, 
L. 6 - p. 10, L. 12.) He stated that no one was forcing him or threatening him to 
get him to plead guilty. (5123106 Tr., p. 72, Ls. 16-22.) The court specifically told 
Stone that it would "rather you not plead and go to trial than to accept something 
you don't want." (5123106 Tr., p. 14, L. 25 - p. 15, L. 2.) Stone stated he 
understood, and still wanted to go through with the guilty plea. (5123106 Tr., p. 
15, Ls. 3-5.) 
Stone failed to support any of the claims in his motions to withdraw his 
guilty plea with any evidence. Even accepting his unsworn "affidavit" as 
evidence, all of the relevant allegations in it are clearly belied by the record. 
Because Stone failed to show a single factual predicate of his motion to 
withdraw, he failed to present any reason, much less a just one, for withdrawing 
his plea. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. 
II. 
Stone Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
The district court sentenced Stone to twenty five years with twenty fixed 
for aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer and five years fixed for 
unlawful possession of a firearm, to be served consecutively. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 
522-26.) Stone argues that this sentence should be considered a fixed life 
sentence, and that a fixed life sentence is excessive. (Appellant's brief, pp. 23- 
26.) Stone's argument that his sentence is the legal equivalent of a fixed life 
sentence is baseless. He has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. Id. 
C. Stone Has Failed To Show That His Sentences Constitute An Abuse Of 
Discretion 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was 
excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To 
establish that the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable 
minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the 
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. 
Farwell, 144 ldaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. In determining whether the appellant 
met his burden, the court considers the entire sentence but, because the 
decision to release him on parole is exclusively the province of the executive 
branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual 
incarceration. State v. Oliver, 144 ldaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 
Stone argues that his sentences amount to a fixed life sentence. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 24-25.) This argument is without legal or factual merit. 
Although especially lengthy fixed sentences have been deemed fixed life 
sentences for purposes of appellate review, in the cases cited by Stone the fixed 
portion of the sentences were, respectively, 80 years, State v. Bello, 135 ldaho 
442, 444, 19 P.3d 66, 68 (Ct. App. 2001), and 65 years, State v. Li, 131 ldaho 
126, 128,952 P.2d 1262,1264 (Ct. App. 1998). By comparison, the ldaho Court 
of Appeals rejected a claim that a sentence of 25 years with fifteen fixed was the 
equivalent of a fixed life sentence where the defendant suffered from a terminal 
illness making it very likely that he would die before being eligible for parole. 
State v. Walker, 125 Idaho 11, 867 P.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1993). Thus, it appears 
from the cases that a fixed sentence must be very long before it is deemed a 
fixed life sentence for purposes of appellate review, and that individual 
circumstances making death before release likely, such as Walker's terminal 
illness, do not suffice to deem a sentence the equivalent of a fixed life sentence. 
In this case Stone argues that because he is a Native American, and 42 
years of age, he will probably die before he serves the 25-year fixed portion of 
his sentences. (Appellant's brief, pp. 23-25.) Stone's circumstances, even if 
accepted as true, are much more like Walker's (where the sentence was not 
deemed equivalent to fixed life) than Bello's or Li's (whose sentences were 
deemed equivalent to fixed life). First, his sentence is much shorter, 25 years 
fixed as opposed to 65 or more years fixed. Second, the primary reason he 
believes he is entitled to a closer scrutiny of his sentence is his belief that he will 
not live to be paroled; but his concern is more like Walker's in this regard also - 
Walker had a terminal illness, while Stone is a member of an allegedly short lived 
ethnic group. Because the legal standard of deeming a sentence the equivalent 
of fixed life for purposes of appellate review appears applicable only to 
extraordinarily lengthy sentences, not merely circumstances where death before 
parole is likely, Stone's arguments are without legal merit. 
Even if Stone's arguments had legal merit, they lack factual merit. Stone 
presented no evidence of what his likely lifespan would be to the district court. 
On appeal he requests this Court to consider actuarial information about Native 
Americans. His request that this Court consider evidence not presented to the 
district court is improper, however. State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 
P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) ("It is axiomatic that an appellate court will not 
consider new evidence that was never before the trial court. We are limited to 
review of the record made below.") (and cases cited). 
Even if it were proper for this Court to consider the evidence cited by 
Stone, it does not support his claim. The evidence actually shows that Native 
Americans have low life expectancy, in great part, because of very high infant 
mortality. Because Stone has clearly survived his infancy, the information cited 
has little predictive value for him. Likewise, Stone's assumption that he will be 
stressed, lack good nutrition, have inadequate medical care, and be exposed to 
life threatening diseases in prison (Appellant's brief, p. 25) is false and 
unsupported by anything but the wildest speculation. It is clear, however, that 
incarceration will likely eliminate at least three activities that could shorten 
Stone's life: drug abuse, alcohol abuse, and shootouts with police. In short, 
Stone's belief that he will die before he is paroled is without factual merit and 
based entirely upon speculation. 
In sentencing the district court specifically considered the four goals of 
sentencing, and indicated it was not sentencing to impose punishment for 
punishment's sake. (10/19/06 Tr., p. 71, L. 22 - p. 72, L. 17.) The court relied 
heavily on Stone's extensive record, especially his extensive history of violent 
felonies. (10119/06 Tr., p. 73, Ls. 14-25; p. 75, Ls. 7-16; see PSI, pp. 5-15 
(multitudinous prior juvenile and criminal convictions, including felony convictions 
for aggravated battery, attempted robbery, and kidnapping).) The court stated 
that giving a sentence less than had been imposed for prior violent felonies 
would severely undermine the goal of deterrence. (10/19/06 Tr., p. 74, Ls. 1-14; 
see PSI, pp. 9-15 (prior sentences of 15 and 10.5 years).) The court concluded 
-
that protection of society and deterrence would justify fixing the maximum 
sentences in this case, but that in the interests of rehabilitation some 
indeterminate time was appropriate. (10/19/06 Tr., p. 75, L. 17 - p. 76, L. 16.) 
The district court's rationale is reasonable on the facts before it. Stone 
has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court's sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests this Court to affirm Stone's convictions and sentences. 
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